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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent's statement
of the Findings of Fact

of facts would only be a duplication

filed

in

this

action

and

adopted by

incorporation as part of Appellants Brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.
service

The

Appellant

both

by

the

has

waived

filing

of

any

his

point as to improper

answer

in

the original

proceeding and by failure to raise the issue at the trial level.
2.

The

Respondents

Appellant in
find a

that he

pleading

gave

pleaded facts

unilateral rescission

adequate notice to the

upon which

of the contract.

the court could
The contract was

still executory in that the parties had not been fully performed;
delivery requires more than transfer of physical possession.
3.

Notwithstanding any

defect in pleading the trial court

has discretion to amend the pleading as provided by statute.
pleadings of

The

the Defendant and the record of the trial should be

considered in

determining

whether

or

not

there

was adequate

notice and a fair hearing afforded.
4.

The agreement

not constitute
required by

a

security

law had

to use the term

between the Respondent and Appellant did
agreement

in

not been satisfied.

contract and

that

the formalities

The appellant attempts

security agreement interchangeably

to obtain the result he desires.

By embracing two theories which

largely cancel one another,

Defendant

the

1

is

able

to espouse

neither.

If the

appellant prevails

on his

retained an interest in the property
does he

not in

fact admit

until he

agreement,

there

repossession

and

of the
was
sale

no
by

was paid

in full

that there was a rescission.

Appellant retained no title how does
physical possession

contention that he

he justify

property.

If the

the retaking of

Even assuming a security

compliance

with

statutes

governing

which the interest of Respondent was

liquidated and the court is left to fashion a remedy based on the
equities of the case.
5.

In all

of his arguments the Defendant ignores the fact

that by his actions he left the court with no
view the

alternative but to

transaction as rescinded since there was no other basis

presented by the facts on which the court

could justly liquidate

the obligations of the parties one to the other.
6.

The Defendant

failed wholly

in an

attempt to justify

claims of surprise, newly discovered evidence or errors in law.
7.

Respondent is

entitled to

double costs

and attorney's

fees on account of this frivolous and dilatory appeal.
POINT I
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE COURTS REFUSAL TO GRANT APPELLANTS
MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE CLOSE OF RESPONDENTS CASE.
Rule 15<b)of the Utah
liberal scheme

Rules of

Civil Procedure

provides a

of amendment with much latitude whereby the court

may obtain a full presentation

of
2

the

merits

of

the

case at

trial.

In COLEMAN

v. COLEMAN 67 Ut Adv. Rep. 7 (Ct. App.

10/02/87) this court held that issues not raised by the pleadings
may be

tried by

express or

implied consent

of the parties and

that those issues shall be treated as if raised by the pleadings.
Examining the record of this case, there is certainly no doubt as
to the time, consideration
We

see

that

in

and subject

Plaintiff's

matter of

pleadings

at

the contract.

paragraph

2,

the

equipment is described as;
" one International Harvester Tractor model
706 and one pair of John Deere twin rakes
models 270 and 271 with cart"
The time is set forth as "on or
1986 M .

The

amount

of

about the

consideration

7th day

of June

as paid by Plaintiff to

Defendant is listed as $5,500.00, (Respondents exhibit I ) .
Any doubt as to whether the
largely

dispelled

by

Defendants

Plaintiff is indebted in
from and

after June

transaction is
answer

the amount

7th, 1986".

identifiable is

which

alleges " that

of $4,500.00

with interest

(Respondents exhibit

adequately plead a cause of action

a party

need only

II). To
present a

short and plain statement of his claim and demand for relief; see
ROSENLOF v- SULLTVAN 676 P2d 372

(12/12/83) Utah

Rules of Civil

Procedure 8(a)
At trial

Plaintiff put

goods for $10,000.00 (T.14),

on his

case that

that Plaintiff

3

he had purchased

traded machinery to

Defendant

at

an

agreed

value

SS^OO.OO 1 and a balance of

of

$4,500.00 remained (Respondents exhibit III).
proved that

Defendant had retaken the equipment (P.55), but that

Defendant had made no
Defendant made

effort

to

no objection

return

Plaintiff's equipment.

to this proffered evidence but did,

at the close of Plaintiff's case, move to
the grounds

that the

Defendant

comprised

go

denied

forward

largely

of
II).

offered by Defendant

that

was

in

affirmative defense.

no

with

his

to

COLEMAN v.

case

and required

in chief which was
type

evidence

heard all of the evidence

within

held

motion

defense

The court
was

way
In

Defendant's

affirmative

(Respondents exhibit

Defendant

dismiss, apparently on

Plaintiff had failed to prove non-delivery

(T.25, 34). The court
that

Plaintiff further

the
his

rules

of evidence.

failure

to plead any

COLEMAN (supra)

this court

said
"If a theory of recovery is fully tried by
the parties, the court may base its decision
on that
theory and
deem the pleadings
amended, even
if
the
theory
was not
originally pleaded
or set forth in the
pleadings or the pretrial order.
However,
that the issue has, in fact, been tried, and
that this procedure has been authorized by
express or implied consent of the parties
must be evident from the record.
A trial
court may not base its decision on an issue
that was tried
inadvertently.
Implied
consent to try an issue may be found where
1

. The Plaintiff has not maintained and cannot maintain
that the trade in property was not worth the value allowed in the

transaction.

4

one party raises an issue material to the
other party's case or where evidence is
introduced without objection, or where it
appears that
the parties understood the
evidence was to be aimed at the unpleaded
issue.
Thus, the test for determining
whether pleading should be deemed amended
under RCP-15(b) is whether the opposing party
has had a fair opportunity to defend and
whether it could offer additional evidence if
the case were retried on a different theory".
Applying the two part test in
possibility

that

Defendant

COLEMAN, is

could

offer

there really any

additional competent,

material evidence which would be pivotal if the case were retried
on a

different theory?

This issue will be addressed more fully

in answering Defendant's contentions in his

"Point III"

but the

answer is simply N0[. Given all that Defendant would offer by way
of additional evidence the same result must obtain; Defendant has
deprived

Plaintiff

of

$5,500.00

by

his

unilateral

act

and

Plaintiff is entitled to recompense.
Considering the other part of the COLEMAN test - whether the
Defendant had

a fair

opportunity to defend - the answer must be

in the affirmative.
nor did

Defendant did

not move

for a continuance,

Defendant object to any evidence offered as being beyond

the scope of Plaintiff's pleadings.

The

Defendant to

importantly, Defendant was

prepared to

his pleadings
defend

the

and most

issue

presented

court

as

did

not limit

evidenced

by his

pleadings (Respondents

exhibit II). By Defendant's presentation

of the law of the case

(T.27,29) and

5

by the

evidence Defendant

put on

in his case in chief, which was that Defendant considered

the contract as executory and elected to rescind it, <T.

44)

it

is apparent that Defendant was not factually surprised or legally
unprepared.
party

It should be

additional

time

noted
after

that
trial

the

court

afforded each

to address the question of

whether or not a security agreement existed; an opportunity which
each of

the parties

availed themselves of (Respondents exhibits

IV and V ) .
One must consider Utah Rule
examining the

which

Civil

Procedure

8(b) when

sufficiency of the pleadings, giving due deference

to Utah Rule of
upon

of

this

Civil Procedure
court

CHENEY v. RUCKER 14 UT 2d

52(a) in

reviews

applying the standard

findings of a trial judge.

205, 211,

381 P2d

86, 91

In

(1963) the

court discussed the rules of pleadings and noted;
"They must all be looked to in light of their
even more fundamental purpose of liberalizing
both pleading and procedure to the end that
the parties are afforded the privilege of
presenting whatever legitimate contentions
they have pertaining to their dispute.
What
they are entitled to is notice of the issues
raised and an opportunity to meet them. When
this is accomplished, that is all that is
required.
Our rules provide for liberality
to allow examination into and settlement of
all issues bearing upon the controversy, but
safeguard the rights of the other party to
have a reasonable time to meet a new issue if
he so requests".
The trial courts findings should be accorded great deference
and should not be set aside unless those findings

6

"...are against the clear weight of the
evidence or we otherwise reach a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been
made", (cases cited).
See

COVE

EXCAVATING

&

CONST,

CO.

v. FLYNN 88 Ut.Adv. Rep. 6

(10/16/88 C.A.).
POINT II
Appellant has waived any
inadequate service

or that

claim that

there was

improper or

there was inadequate notice of trial

setting.
Respecting the novel presentation of the
in footnotes

issue as expounded

1 and 2 at page 11 of Appellants brief and assuming

by those notations that

Appellant

is

attempting

to

raise the

issue of service the Respondent can only answer by noting that if
some defect in service was present, it is
record on

not apparent

from the

appeal nor was the issue preserved at the trial level.

In SMITH v. VUICICH

699 P2d

763 8

Ut. Adv.

Rep. 5

(1985) the

court held that;
"Where the
record before
the court is
incomplete, it is unable
to review the
evidence as
a whole and must therefore
presume that the verdict was supported by
admissable and competent evidence".
See also BURKE v. BURKE 733 P2d 133; 43 Ut. Adv. Rep.11 (1986).
In the

recent case of WISDEN v. CITY OF SALINA 709 P2d 371,

21 Ut. Adv. Rep 20 (10/20/85) This court

refused to

address the

issue of improper service when it was first raised on appeal.

7

POINT III
As are

the arguments

in Point III are specious
appellant are

in Appellants Point I, the arguments
and

the

largely fabricated

legal

distinctions

made by

from a misjoinder of statutory

law.
Appellant assumes without explanation
of

the

requirements

of

requirements of 70A-9-201 et.

that the satisfaction

UCA

70A-1-20K3)

seq.

and

satisfies

the

particularly 70A-9-203.

The sparsity of writing and lack of supplementary oral agreements
that might®

create the

right of

repossession and

the right of

disposition of collateral are largely glossed over by accusations
of lack of "good faith" and "honesty".
that

these

alleged

improper

acts

Somehow Appellant assumes
of

Respondent

excuse the

departure from the formal requisites of a security agreement, the
lack of which is admitted by Appellant in his brief (P. 15). One
might ask in response
the

specific

right to
both?

default

repossess How

does

to the
of

Respondent
lack of

good faith

Appellant

propose

to

remaining interest

Does

- what was

that triggered Appellants

was it

interest in the equipment?
has any

Appellants contentions

or honesty or

liquidate respondents

Appellant deny

that respondent

in the equipment - Respondent claims

•• The Respondent argues otherwise and contends that each
enforceable provision of a security agreement must be in writing
and signed by the parties see HAGGIS MANAGEMENT INC. v. TURTLE
MANAGEMENT INC. 19 Ut. Adv. Rep. 42 (10-03-85).

8

to have repossessed it - who now has title? Consider
UCA 70A-2-401.
POINT IV
The actual point made by Defendant in his motion to dismiss
at the close of Plaintiff's case was not that there
offered on

an issue not pleaded but was that since Plaintiff had

admitted that for a
the subject

short period

equipment, there

he had

physical possession of

had been no prima facia showing of

non-delivery and thus Defendant was entitled to a
is generally

the law

that delivery

(1972) quotes

MILLER v.

dismissal-

It

requires more than physical

transfer of possession of some item.
Ed. Rev,

was evidence

BLACKS

LAW DICTIONARY 4th

HOSPELHORN 176 Md. 356, 4 A2d

728 as holding;
"What constitutes delivery depends largely on
the intent of the parties.
It is not
necessary that delivery should be by manual
transfer".
In

response

to

Defendant's

contention

in

his Motion to

Dismiss, Plaintiff argued to the trial court that

there were two

theories

conversion

upon

which

Plaintiff

could

conditional delivery and rescission3.
DOBNER 165

Minn. 87,

205 N.W.

recover;

In the case of SILLIMAN v.

696, 697

3

or

as cited in Blacks Law

. Plaintiff could have also styled the action as one in
Quasi-Contract, having
waived the
tort and
relied on a
"fictitious" sale to the converter (recovery in assumpsit)
Plaintiff establishing the fair market value by relying on the

recent transaction.

9

Dictionary (supra) the court held;
"A conditional delivery is one which passes
the thing subject to
delivery from the
possession of the grantor, but is not to be
completed by possession of the grantee, or a
third
person
as
his agent, until the
happening of a specified event".
Appellant cannot maintain that
possession of

the equipment

just

Appellant such

Plaintiff had

at one time, that there had been an

unconditional delivery, particularly in
acts of

because

as a

light of

the subsequent

retaking without notice or process

and subsequent denial of any claim of interest by Plaintiff.
Respecting
failure to

Appellants

grant a

claim

of

abuse

of

discretion

in

new trial the claim of surprise by Defendant

is belied by the pleading and proceedings had at the trial level.
Defendant in

his pleadings

and argument

acknowledged

Motion to

Dismiss

payment.

Defendant argued vigorously and cited the UCC verbatim

to the proposition that
existence

of

justified

Defendant's

maintained

a

the

balance

contract

dealings

owed

by

retaking

Defendant's

a

in connection with his

right

of

the

of

equipment

retake

a substantial

parties

Plaintiff

the

to

the

and

and the

to Defendant
and further

without

making

restitution.
The

Defendant's

claims

of

newly

discovered

evidence as

justifying a new trial are these
(a) Evidence that Defendant did not make
attempts to secure financing in order to pay

the balance

owed to Defendant.

10

<b) Evidence that Plaintiff did not purchase
equipment to replace the equipment retaken by
Defendant.
<c) Additional evidence that the recovery of
the disputed equipment took place in November
1986 not September 1986.
<d) Evidence that during the approximate time
of the retaking of the disputed equipment by
Defendant, Plaintiff had additional equipment
repossessed by John Deere Credit and/or other
creditors.
Respondent is

constrained to ask - given a retaking without

consent of Respondent, how could proof
contentions assist

Appellant.

of each

Further

or any

proof of <a) or (b) or

(d) would only add support to the courts finding of
rescission.

Proof relating

of these

a unilateral

to (c) would not be relevant to any

issue except the veracity of the parties and

there is remarkably

little dispute as to the material facts necessary for decision in
this case.
The court gave the parties ample time to brief the law after
the

trial

and

before

rendering

a

decision,

the

Respondent

certainly cannot complain as to inadequate opportunity to present
the law

to the

court.

It seems that the court must have either
i

found a right of repossession or in the alternative have
rescission or

conversion.

The Defendant did not show a right to

repossession then and cannot
"newly discovered

found a

evidence".

show

one

now:

given

all

of his

In BARSON et al v. SQUIBB 682 P2d

11

832 (04/12/84) the court said;
M

A moving party must show three things in
order for a new trial to be granted on the
basis of newly discovered evidence: (a) there
is material, competent evidence which is in
fact newly discovered; <b> by due diligence
the evidence could not have been discovered
and produced at trial; and (c) the evidence
must not be merely cumulative or incidental
but must be of sufficient substance that
there is a reasonable likelihood that with it
there would have been a different result".
Appellant

has,

even

given

credence to the claim that the

evidence is newly discovered, made no
is competent
file,

it

employed.

is

or material.
difficult

to

No

showing that

the evidence

discovery being evident from the

maintain

that

due

diligence

was

Much of the new evidence is certainly cumulative only,

if not repetitious and most

importantly,

none

of

the proposed

evidence would be pivotal to the case.
In GODDARD v. HICKMAN 685 P2d 530 (05/01/84) the court said;
"A trial court has broad latitude in granting
or denying a motion for a new trial, and will
not be overturned on appeal absent a clear
abuse of discretion".
POINT V
In BBIGHAM CITY v. MANTUA TOWN 83 Ut. Adv. Rep. 21 (Ct. App.
05/24/88) this court said at page 26;
"The record shows a deliberate course of
conduct designed to frustrate the purposes of
the parties' agreement and an attempt by
Mantua to ^rewrite the whole contract'".
In this action, has

not the

12

Defendant attempted

to retain

what was

his and to take what was Plaintiffs.

right founded in an
and without

agreement of

resort to

the parties

process.

of both of the parties and

Without resort to
(written or oral)

The Plaintiff took the property

made it

his.

As might

be expected

this tactic did not withstand the test of legality or the view of
the trial court aa to equity.

Now the Appellant uses the vehicle

of appeal to frustrate and delay inevitable restitution by asking
this court to "rewrite the whole contract".
Rule 33(a)

of

the

Rules

of

the

Utah

Court

of Appeals

provides that;
"If the court determines that a motion made
or an appeal taken under these rules is
either frivolous or for delay, it shall award
just damages and single or double costs,
including reasonable attorney fees, to the
prevailing party".
This is just such an appeal, frivolous and baseless.
CONCLUSION
The trial court should be affirmed and as
should

be

remanded

to

Respondents attorneys feea

the

affirmed the case

trial court for a determination of

and double costs of appeal.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _&.„ day of October, 1988

A r-Mhr Lauritszen
Attorney fdp Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of October, 1988 I
mailed four <4) copies of the foregoing Statement of Facts to
Jeff R. T h o m e , Attorney for Defendant at 98 North Main, P. 0.
Box "F", Brigham City, Utah 84302

AVJtf^ Laxii
Attorney

14

en
laintiff

U N I F O R M COMMERCIAL CODE

667

70A-1-104. Construction against implicit repeal.
This act being a general act intended as a unified
coverage of its subject matter, no part of it shall be
deemed to be impliedly repealed by subsequent legislation if such construction can reasonably be avoided.
1965

70A-1-105. Territorial application of the act —
Parties' power to choose applicable
law.
(1) Except as provided hereafter in this section,
when a transaction bears a reasonable relation to this
state and also to another state or nation the parties
may agree that the law either of this state or of such
other state or nation shall govern their rights and
duties. Failing such agreement this act applies to
transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this
state.
(2) Where one of the following provisions of this act
specifies the applicable law, that provision governs
and a contrary agreement is effective only to the extent permitted by the law (including the conflict of
laws rules) so specified:
Rights of creditors against sold goods. Section
70A-2-402.
Applicability of the chapter on Bank Deposits
and Collections. Section 70A-4-102.
Bulk transfers subject to the chapter on Bulk
Transfers. Section 70A-6-102.
Applicability of the chapter on Investment Securities. Section 70A-8-106.
Perfection provisions of the chapter on Secured
Transactions. Section 70A-9-103.
irn
70A-1-106. Remedies to be liberally administered.
(1) The remedies provided by this act shall be liberally administered to the end that the aggrieved
party may be put in as good a position as if the other
party had fully performed but neither consequential
or special nor penal damages may be had except as
specifically provided in this act or by other rule of
law.
(2) Any right or obligation declared by this act is
enforceable by action unless the provision declaring it
specifies a different and limited effect.
lses
70A-1-107. Waiver or renunciation of claim or
right after breach.
Any claim or right arising out of an alleged breach
can be discharged in whole or in part without consideration by a written waiver or renunciation signed
and delivered by the aggrieved party.
lses
70A-1-108. Severability.
If any provision or clause of this act or application
• thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions
or applications of the act which can be given effect
without the invalid provision or application, and to
this end the provisions of this act are declared to be
severable.
19W
70A-1-109. Section captions.
Section captions are parts of this act.

is«s

PART 2
GENERAL DEFINITIONS AND PRINCIPLES
OF INTERPRETATION
Section
70A-1-201. General definitions.
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70A-1-201

Section
70A-1-202. Prima facie evidence by third-party documents.
70A-1-203. Obligation of good faith.
70A-1-204. Time — Reasonable time — "Seasonably."
70A-1-205. Course of dealing and usage of trade.
70A-1-206. Statute of frauds for kinds of personal
property not otherwise covered.
70A-1-207. Performance or acceptance under reservation of rights.
70A-1-208. Option to accelerate at will.
70A-1-201. General definitions.
Subject to additional definitions contained in the
subsequent chapters of this act which are applicable
to specific chapters or parts thereof, and unless the
context otherwise requires, in this act:
(1) "Action" in the sense of a judicial proceeding includes recoupment, counterclaim, setoff,
suit in equity and any other proceedings in which
rights are determined.
(2) "Aggrieved party" means a party entitled
to resort to a remedy.
(3) "Agreement" means the bargain of the par«
ties in fact as found in their language or by implication from other circumstances including
course of dealing or usage of trade or course of
performance as provided in this act (Sections
70A-1-205 and 70A-2-208). Whether an agreement has legal consequences is determined by
the provisions of this act, if applicable; otherwise
by the law of contracts (Section 70A-1-103).
(Compare "Contract.")
(4) "Bank" means any person engaged in the
business of banking.
(5) "Bearer" means the person in possession of
an instrument, document of title, or security payable to bearer or indorsed in blank.
(6) "Bill of lading" means a document evidencing the receipt of goods for shipment issued by a
person engaged in the business of transporting or
forwarding goods, and includes an airbill. "Airbill" means a document serving for air transportation as a bill of lading does for marine or rail
transportation, and includes an air consignment
note or air waybill.
(7) "Branch" includes a separately incorporated foreign branch of a bank.
(8) "Burden of establishing" a fact means the
burden of persuading the triers of fact that the
existence of the fact is more probable than its
nonexistence.
(9) "Buyer in ordinary course of business"
means a person who in good faith and without
knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of
the ownership rights or security interest of a
third party in the goods buys in ordinary course
from a person in the business of selling goods of
that kind but does not include a pawnbroker. All
persons who sell minerals or the like (including
oil and gas) at wellhead or minehead shall be
deemed to be persons in the business of selling
goods of that kind. "Buying" may be for cash or
by exchange of other property or on secured or
unsecured credit and includes receiving goods or
documents of title under a pre-existing contract
for sale but does not include a transfer in bulk or
as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of
a money debt.
(10) "Conspicuous**: A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a reasonable

(c) complies with the filing provisions of the
chapter on Secured Transactions (chapter 9).
(4) Any "or return" term of a contract for sale is to
be treated as a separate contract for sale within the
statute of frauds section of this chapter (Section
70A-2-201) and as contradicting the sale aspect of the
contract within the provisions of this chapter on parol
or extrinsic evidence (Section 70A-2-202).
1965
70A-2-327. Special incidents of sale on approval
and aale or return.
,(1) Under a sale on approval unless otherwise
agreed
. (a) although the goods are identified to the
contract the risk of loss and the title do not pass
to the buyer until acceptance; and
(b) use of the goods consistent with the purpose of trial is not acceptance but failure seasonably to notify the seller of election to return the
goods is acceptance, and if the goods conform to
the contract acceptance of any part is acceptance
of the whole; and
(c) after due notification of election to return,
the return is at the seller's risk and expense but
a merchant buyer must follow any reasonable instructions.
(2) Under a sale or return unless otherwise agreed
(a) the option to return extends to the whole or
any commercial unit of the goods while in substantially their original condition, but must be
exercised seasonably; and
(b) the return is at the buyer's risk and expense.
1964
70A-2-328. Sale b y auction.
(1) In a sale by auction if goods are put up in lots
each lot is the subject of a separate sale.
(2) A sale by auction is complete when the auctioneer so announces by the fall of the hammer or in other
customary manner. Where a bid is made while the
hammer is falling in acceptance of a prior bid the
auctioneer may in his discretion reopen the bidding
or declare the goods sold under the bid on which the
hammer was falling.
(3) Such a sale is with reserve unless the goods are
in explicit terms put up without reserve. In an auction with reserve the auctioneer may withdraw the
goods at any time until he announces completion of
the sale. In an auction without reserve, after the auctioneer calls for bids on an article or lot, that article
or lot cannot be withdrawn unless no bid is made
within a reasonable time. In either case a bidder may
retract his bid until the auctioneer's announcement of
completion of the sale, but a bidder's retraction does
not revive any previous bid.
(4) If the auctioneer knowingly receives a bid on
the seller's behalf or the seller makes or procures
such a bid, and notice has not been given that liberty
for such bidding is reserved, the buyer may at his
option avoid the sale or take the goods at the price of
the last good faith bid prior to the completion of the
sale. This subsection shall not apply to any bid at a
forced sale.
lses

Section
70A-2-402.
70A-2-403.

Rights of seller's creditors against sold
goods.
Power to transfer — Good faith purchase

of goods — "Entrusting."
70A-2-401. Passing of title — Reservation for security — Limited application of this
section.
Each provision of this chapter with regard to the
rights, obligations and remedies of the seller, the
buyer, purchasers or other third parties applies irrespective of title to the goods except where the provision refers to such title. In so far as situations are not
covered by the other provisions of this chapter and
matters concerning title become material the following rules apply:
(1) Title to goods cannot pass under a contract
for sale prior to their identification to the contract (Section 70A-2-501), and unless otherwise
explicitly agreed the buyer acquires by their
identification a special property as limited by
this act. Any retention or reservation by the
seller of the title (property) in goods shipped or
delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a
reservation of a security interest. Subject to these
provisions and to the provisions of the chapter on
Secured Transactions (Chapter 9), title to goods
passes from the seller to the buyer in any manner
and on any conditions explicitly agreed on by the
parties.
(2) Unless otherwise explicitly agreed title
passes to the buyer at the time and place at
which the seller completes his performance with
reference to the physical delivery of the goods,
despite any reservation of a security interest and
even though a document of title is to be delivered
at a different time or place; and in particular and
despite any reservation of a security interest by
the bill of lading
(a) if the contract requires or authorizes
the seller to send the goods to the buyer but
does not require him to deliver them at destination, title passes to the buyer at the time
and place of shipment; but
(b) if the contract requires delivery at destination, title passes on tender there.
(3) Unless otherwise explicitly agreed where
delivery is to be made without moving the goods,
(a) if the seller is to deliver a document of
title, title passes at the time when and the
place where he delivers such documents; or
(b) if the goods are at the time of contracting already identified and no documents are
to be delivered, title passes at the time and
place of contracting.
(4) A rejection or other refusal by the buyer to
receive or retain the goods, whether or not justified, or a justified revocation of acceptance revests title to the goods in the seller. Such revesting occurs by operation of law and is not a "sale."
196S

PART 4
TITLE, CREDITORS A N D GOOD
FAITH P U R C H A S E R S
Section
70A-2-401. Passing of title —• Reservation for security — Limited application of this section.
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70A-2-402. Rights of seller's creditors against
sold good8.
(1) Except as provided in Subsections (2) and (3),
rights of unsecured creditors of the seller with respect
to goods which have been identified to a contract for
sale are subject to the buyer's rights to recover the
goods under this chapter (Sections 70A-2-502 and
70A-2-716).

erations or if they are products of crops or livestock in their unmanufactured states (such as
ginned cotton, wool-clip, maple syrup, milk and
eggs), and if they are in the possession of a debtor
engaged in raising, fattening, grazing or other
farming operations. If goods are farm products
they are neither equipment nor inventory;
(4) "inventory" if they are held by a person
who holds them for sale or lease or to be furnished under contracts of service or if he hus so
furnished them, or if they are raw materials,
work in process or materials used or consumed in
a business. Inventory of a person is not to be classified as his equipment.
i&es
70A-9-110. Sufficiency of description.
For the purposes of this chapter any description of
personal property or, except as otherwise required by
Subsection (1) of Section 70A-9-402 relating to the
contents of a financing statement, real estate is sufficient whether or not it is specific if it reasonably identifies what is described.
1965
70A-9-111. Applicability of bulk transfer laws.
The creation of a security interest is not a bulk
transfer under Chapter 6 (see Section 70A-6-103).
1965

70A-9-112. Where collateral is not owned by
debtor.
Unless otherwise agreed, when a secured party
.knows that collateral is owned by a person who is not
the debtor, the owner of the collateral is entitled to
receive from the secured party any surplus under Section 70A-9-502(2) or under Section 70A-9-504(l), and
is not liable for the debt or for any deficiency after
resale, and he has the same right as the debtor
(a) to receive statements under Section
70A-9-208;
(b) to receive notice of and to object to a secured parly's proposal to retain the collateral in
satisfaction of the indebtedness under Section
70A-9.605;
(c) to redeem the collateral under Section
70A-9-506;
(d) to obtain injunctive or other relief under
section 70A-9-507U); and

(e) to recover losses caused to him under Section 70A-9-208(2).
less
70A-9-113. Security interests arising under
chapter on Sales.
A security interest arising solely under the chapter
on Sales (Chapter 2) is subject to the provisions of
this chapter except that to the extent that and so long
as the debtor does not have or does not lawfully obtain possession of the goods
(a) no security agreement is necessary to make
the security interest enforceable; and
(b) no filing is required to perfect the security
interest; and
(c) the rights of the secured party on default by
the debtor are governed by the chapter on Sales
(Chapter 2).
loss
70A-9-114. C o n s i g n m e n t
(1) A person who delivers goods under a consignment which is not a security interest and who would
be required to file under this chapter by Paragraph
(3)(c) of Section 70A-2-326 has priority over a secured
party who is or becomes a creditor of the consignee
and who would have a perfected security interest in
the goods if they were the property of the consignee,
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and also has priority with respect to identifiable cash
proceeds received on or before delivery of the goods to
a buyer, if
|
(a) the consignor;complies with the filing provision of the chapter on sales with respect to consignments
(Paragraph
(3)(c)
of
Section
70A-2-326) before the consignee receives possession of the goods; and
(b) the consignor gives notification in writing
to the holder of the Security interest if the holder
has filed a financing statement covering the
same types of goods before the date of the filing
made by the consignor, and
(c) the holder of the security interest receives
the notification within five years before the consignee receives possession of the goods; and
(d) the notification states that the consignor
expects to deliver goods on consignment to the
consignee, describing the goods by item or type.
(2) In the case of a consignment which is not a
security interest and in which the requirements of
the preceding subsection have not been met, a person
who delivers goods to another is subordinate to a per*
son who would have a perfected security interest in
the goods if they were the property of the debtor.
Iff?

P^RT 2
VALIDITY OF SECURITY AGREEMENT AND RIGHTS OF
PARTIES THERETO
Section
70A-9-201. General validity of security agreement
70A-9-202. Title to collateral immaterial.
70A-9-203. Attachment and enforceability of security interest — Proceeds, formal requisites.
70A-9-204. After-acquired property — Future advances.
70A-9-205. Use or disposition of collateral without
accounting permissible.
70A-9-206. Agreement not to assert defenses
against assignee — Modification of
sales warranties where security
agreement exists.
70A-9-207. Rights and duties when collateral is in
secured party's possession.
70A-9-208. Request for statement of account ortfist
of collateral.
70A-9-201. General validity of security agreement.
Except as otherwise provided by this act a security
agreement is effective according to its terms between
the parties, against purchasers of the collateral and
against creditors..Nothing in this chapter validates
any charge or practice illegal under any statute or
regulation thereunder governing usury, small loans,
retail installment sales, or the like, or extends the
application of any such statute or regulation to any
transaction not otherwise subject thereto.
is«5
70A-9-202. Title to collateral immaterial.
Each provision of this chapter with regard to
rights, obligations and remedies applies whether title
to collateral is in the secured party or in the debtor.
1»66

70A-9-203. Attachment and enforceability of security Interest «- Proceeds, formal requisites.
(1) Subject to the provisions of Section 70A-4-208
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on the security interest of a collecting bank and Section 70A-9-113 on a security interest arising under
the chapter on sales, a security interest is not enforceable against the debtor or third parties with respect
to the collateral and does not attach unless
(a) the collateral is in the possession of the secured party pursuant to agreement, or the debtor
has signed a security agreement which contains
a description of the collateral and in addition,
when the security interest covers crops growing
or to be grown or timber to be cut, a description of
the land concerned; and
(b) value has been given; and
(c) the debtor has rights in the collateral.
(2) A security interest attaches when it becomes
enforceable against the debtor with respect to the collateral. Attachment occurs as soon as all of the events
specified in Subsection (1) have taken place unless
explicit agreement postpones the time of attaching.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed a security agreement
gives the secured party the rights to proceeds provided by Section 70A-9-306.
(4) A transaction, although subject to this chapter,
is also subject to the Utah Uniform Consumer Credit
Code, and in the case of conflict between the provisions of this chapter and the Utah Uniform Consumer
Credit Code, the provisions of the latter statute control. Failure to comply with any applicable statute
has only the effect which is specified therein.
1977
70A-9-204. After-acquired property — Future
advances.
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), a security
agreement may provide that any or all obligations
covered by the security agreoment are to be secured
by afler-acquired collateral.
(2) No security interest attaches under an after-acquired property clause to consumer goods other than
accessions (Section 70A-9-314) when given as additional security unless the debtor acquires rights in
them within ten days after the secured party gives
value.
(3) Obligations covered by a security agreement
may include future advances or other value whether
or not the advances or value are given pursuant to
commitment (Subsection (1) of Section 70A-9-105).
1977

70A-9-205. Use or disposition of collateral without accounting permissible.
A security interest is not invalid or fraudulent
against creditors by reason of liberty in the debtor to
use, commingle or dispose of all or part of the collateral (including returned or repossessed goods) or to
collect or compromise accounts or chattel paper, or to
accept the return of goods or make repossessions, or
to use, commingle or dispose of proceeds, or by reason
of the failure of the secured party to require the
debtor to account for proceeds or replace collateral.
This section does not relax the requirements of possession where oerfection of a security interest depends upon possession of the collateral by the secured
party or by a bailee.
1977
70A-9-206. A g r e e m e n t n o t to assert d e f e n s e s
against assignee — Modification of
sales warranties where security agreement exists.
(1) Subject to any statute or decision which establishes a different rule for buyers or lessees of consumer goods, an agreement by a buyer or lessee that
he will not assert against an assignee nny claim or
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70A-9-208

defense which he may have against the seller or lessor js enforceable by an assignee who takes his assignment for value, in good faith and without notice
of a claim or defense, except as to defenses of a type
whilh may be asserted against a holder in due course
of a negotiable instrument under the chapter on Commercial Paper (Chapter 3). A buyer who as part of one
transaction signs both a negotiable instrument arid a
security agreement makes such an agreement.
(2) When a seller retains a purchase money security interest in goods the chapter on Sales (Chapter 2)
governs the sale and any disclaimer, limitation or
modification of the seller's warranties.
l»«s
70A-9-207. Rights and duties when collateral la
in secured party's possession.
(1) A secured party must use reasonable care in
the custody and preservation of collateral in his poa8 e s s i o n . In the case of an instrument or chattel paper
reasonable care includes taking necessary steps to
preserve rights against prior parties unless otherwise
agreed.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed, when collateral Is in
the secured party's possession
(a) reasonable expenses (including the cost of
any insurance and payment of taxes or other
charges) incurred in the custody, preservation,
use or operation of the collateral are chargeable
to the debtor and are secured by the collateral;
(b) the risk of accidental lots or damage is on
the debtor to the extent of any deficiency in any
effective insurance coverage;
(c) the secured party may hold as additional
security any increase or profits (except money)
received from the collateral, but money so received, unless remitted to the debtor, shall, be
applied in reduction of the'secured obligation;
(d) the secured party must keep the collateral
identifiable but fungible collateral may be commingled;
(e) the secured party may repledge the collateral upon terms which do not impair the debtor's
right to redeem it.
(3) A secured party is liable for any loss caused by
his failure to meet any obligation imposed by the preceding subsections but does not lose his security interest.
(4) A secured party may use or operate the collateral for the purpose of preserving the collateral or its
valt*e o r pursuant to the order of a court of appropriate jurisdiction or, except in the case of consumer
goods, in the manner and to the extent provided in
the security agreement.
lses
70A-9-208. Request for statement of account or
list of collateral.
(}) A debtor may sign a statement indicating what
he thieves to be the aggregate amount of unpaid indebtedness as of a specified date and may send it to
the secured party with a request that the statement
be approved or corrected and returned to the debtor.
Wh e n Che security agreement or any other record
kept by the secured party identifies the collateral a
debtor may similarly request the secured party to approve or correct a list of the collateral.
(2) The secured party must comply with such a request within two weeks after receipt by sending a
written correction or approval. If the secured party
claims a security interest in all of a particular type of
collateral owned by the debtor he may indicate that
f ac t in his reply and need not approve or correct an
itemized list of such collateral. If the secured party

run shall not be included. The last day of the period
so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday,
a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day which is not a
Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the
period of time prescribed or allowed is less than seven
days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation.
(b) Enlargement When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of the court an act is
required or allowed to be done at or within a specified
time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its
discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order
the period enlarged if request therefor is made before
the expiration of the period originally prescribed or
aa extended by a previous order or (2) upon motion
made after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the
result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the
time for taking any action under Rules 50(b), 52(b),
69(b), (d) and (e), 60(b) and 73(a) and (g), except to the
extent and under the conditions stated in them.
(c) Unaffected by expiration of term. The period
of time provided for the doing of any act or the taking
of any proceeding is not affected or limited by the
continued existence or expiration of a term of court.
Hie continued existence or expiration of a term of
court in no way affects the power of a court to do any
act or take any proceeding in any civil action which
has been pending before i t
(d) For motions — Affidavits. A written motion,
other than one which may be heard ex parte, and
notice of the hearing thereof shall be served not later
than 5 days before the time specified for the hearing,
unless a different period is fixed by these rules or by
order of the court Such an order may for cause shown
be made on ex parte application. When a motion is
supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall be served
with the motion; and, except as otherwise provided in
Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may be served not
later than 1 day before the hearing, unless the court
permits them to be served at some other time.
(e) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a party has the right or is required to do some
act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period alter the service of a notice or other paper upon
him and the notice or paper is served upon him by
mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period.

PART III.
PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS.
Rule 7. Pleadings allowed; form of motions.
(a) Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an
answer; a reply to a counterclaim denominated as
such; an answer to a cross-claim, if the answer contains a cross-claim; a third-party complaint, if a person who was not an original party is summoned under the provisions of Rule 14; and a third-party answer, if a third-party complaint is served. No other
pleading shall be allowed, except that the court may
order a reply to an answer or a third-party answer.
(b) Motions, orders and other papers.
(1) Motions. An application to the court for an
order shall be by motion which, unless made during a hearing or trial, shall be made in writing,
shall state with particularity the grounds therefor, and shall set forth the relief or order sought.
The requirement of writing is fulfilled if the motion is stated in a written notice of the hearing of
the motion.
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(2) Orders. An order includes every direction
of the court including a minute order made and
entered in writing and not included in a judgment. An order for the payment of money may be
enforced by execution in the same manner as if it
were a judgment. Except as otherwise specifically provided by these rules, any order made
without notice to the adverse party may be vacated or modified without notice by the judge
who made it, or may be vacated or modified on
notice.
(3) Hearings on motions or order* to show
cause. When on the day fixed for the hearing of a
motion or an order to show cause, the judge be*
fore whom such motion or order is to be heard is
unable to hear the parties, the matter shall stand
continued until the further order of the court, or
it may be transferred by the court or judge to
some other judge of the court for such hearing.
(4) Application of rules to motions, orders,
and other papers. The rules applicable to captions, signing!, and other matters of form of
pleadings apply to all motions, orders, and other
papers provided for by these rules.
(c) Demurrers, pleas, etc., abolished. Demurrers, pleas, and exceptions for insufficiency of a plead*
ing shall not be used.
Rule 8. General rules of pleadings.
(a) Claims for relief. A pleading which sets forth
a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall contain
(1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand
for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself
entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded.
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state
in short and plain terms his defenses to each claim
asserted and shall admit or deny the averments upon
which the adverse party relies. If he is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state and
this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly
meet the substance of the averments denied. When a
pleader intends in good faith to deny only a part or a
qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much
of it as is true and material and shall deny only the
remainder. Unless the pleader intends in good faith
to controvert all the averments of the preceding
pleading, he may make his denials as specific denials
of designated averments or paragraphs, or he may
generally deny all the averments except such designated averments or paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he does so intend to controvert all its
averments, he may do so by general denial subject to
the obligations set forth in Rule 11.
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in
bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration,
fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of
frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any other
matter constituting an avoidance of affirmative defense. When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires, shall
treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation.
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could have been set up, the two demands shall be
deemed compensated so far as they equal each other,
and neither can be deprived of the benefit thereof by
the assignment or death of the other, except as provided in Subdivision (j) of this rule.
(j) Claims against assignee. Except as otherwise
provided by law as to negotiable instruments and assignments of accounts receivable, any claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim which could have boon assorted
against an assignor at the time of or before notice of
such assignment, may be asserted against his assignee, to the extent that such claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim does not exceed recovery upon the claim
of the assignee.
(k) Claim in excess of court's jurisdiction.
Where any counterclaim or cross-claim or third-party
claim is filed in an action in a city court or justice's
court, and due to its limited jurisdiction, such court
does not have the power to grant the relief sought
thereby, it shall suspend all proceedings in the entire
action and certify the same and transmit all papers
therein to the district court of the county in which
such inferior court is maintained, upon the payment
by the party filing such counterclaim, cross-claim or
third-party claim of the fees required for certifying
the record on appeal from such court and for docketing the same in the district court. The fees herein
required to be paid, shall be deposited with the clerk
of the inferior court at the time of filing such counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. For failure so
to do, the court may, upon motion of the adverse
party, after notice, strike such counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim.
In any action so certified to the district court, when
any responsive pleading is required or permitted or a
motion is allowed under these rules, the time in
which such responsive pleading or motion shall be
made shall commence to run from the time notice of
the filing of the cause in the district court shall be
served on the party making such responsive pleading
or motion.
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an<l cross-claims as provided in Rule 13. A thirdparty defendant may proceed under this rule against
any person not a party to the action who is or may be
liable to him for all or part of the claim made in the
action against the third-party defendant
(b) When plaintiff may bring in third party.
When a counterclaim is asserted against a plaintiff,
he may cause a third party to be brought in under
circumstances which under this rule would entitle a
defendant to do so.

Rule 15, Amended and supplemental pleadlnfa,
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a
responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one
to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the
action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he
may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is
served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading
only by leave of court or by written consent of the
adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when
justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to
an amended pleading within the time remaining for
response to the original pleading or within 10 days
after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the court otherwise
orders.
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence.
When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall
be treated in ail respects as If they had been raised in
the pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings as
may be necessary to cause them to conform to the
evidence and to raise these issues may oe made upon
motion of any party at any time, even after judgment;
but failure so to amend does not affect the result of
the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at
the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues
made by the pleadings, the court may allow the
pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the
merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the
objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the adRule 14. Third-party practice.
mission of such evidence would prejudice him in
. (a) When defendant may bring in third party. maintaining his action or defense upon the merits.
At any time after commencement of the action a de- The court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to
fendant, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a sum- enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.
mons and complaint to be served upon a person not a
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the
party to the action who is or may be liable to him for claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading
all or part of the plaintiffs claim against him. The arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence
third-party plaintiff need not obtain leave to make set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original
the service if he files the third-party complaint not pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of
later than ten days after he serves his original an- the original pleading.
swer. Otherwise he must obtain leave on motion upon
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a
notice to all parties to the action. The person served party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon
with the summons and third-party complaint, herein- such terms as are just, permit him to serve a suppleafter called the third-party defendant, shall make his mental pleading setting forth transactions or occurdefenses to the third-party plaintiffs claim as pro- rences or events which have happened since the date
vided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims against the of the pleading sought to be supplemented. Permisthird-party plaintiff and cross-claims against other sion may be granted even though the original pleadthird-party defendants as provided in Rule 13. The ing is defective in its statement of a claim for relief or
\hiTd-party dfcfe&d&x& may fcaaeit &%%\i\&t tta p\*\T\- deform-1£ \iifc tourV usem*ftfcdvia&YAe\h&t Mb* adtiffany defenses which the third-party plaintiff has to verse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it
the plaintiffs claim. The third-party defendant may shall so order, specifying the time therefor.
also assert any claim against the plaintiff arising out
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject Rale 16. Pretrial conferences, scheduling, and
matter of the plaintiffs claim against the third-party
management conferences.
plaintiff. The plaintiff may assert any claim against
(a) Pretrial conferences. In any action, the court
the third-party defendant arising out of the transac- in its discretion or upon motion of a party, may direct
tion or occurrence that is the subject matter of the the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented
plaintiffs claim against the third-party plaintiff, and parties to appear before it for a conference or conferthe third-party defendant thereupon shall assert his ences before trial for such purposes as:
defenses as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims
(1) expediting the disposition of the action;
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addition, shall describe specifically the nature of the
case, the issues presented, and any special reasons
the parties may have for an expedited decision. The
court may, in the absence of a motion or stipulation,
dispose of any case under this rule sua sponte.
(b) Cases which qualify for expedited decision.
Appeals involving uncomplicated factual issues based
primarity tm docvuiteTiVa, B\rrcYmfcT^ iudgTrveiAs, dismissals for failure to state a claim, dismissals for lack
of personal or subject matter jurisdiction, and judgments or orders based on uncomplicated issues of law
are, in general, of a type which the court will consider
on a motion for expedited decision. In all motions
brought under this rule, the substantive rules of law
should be deemed settled, although the parties may
differ as to their application.
(c) Appeals ineligible for expedited decision.
The court will not grant a motion for an expedited
appeal in cases raising substantive constitutional issues, issues of significant public interest, issues of
law of first impression, or complicated issues of fact or
law or in criminal cases.
(d) Procedure if expedited motion is granted. If
a motion for expedited decision is granted by the
court, the appeal will be given an expedited setting
for oral argument within 45 to 60 days from the date
of the order granting the motion. Within two days
after submission of the appeal, the court will conference, decide the case, and issue a written order which
need not be accompanied by an opinion. Entry of the
order by the clerk in the records of the court shall
constitute the entry of the judgment of the court.
(e) Precedential effect. Appeals decided under
this rule without written opinions will not stand as
precedent of the court hut, m other respects, wiYt have
the same force and effect as other decisions of the
court.
(0 Issuance of written opinion. If it appears to
the court alter the case has been submitted for decision that a written opinion should be issued, the time
limitation in Paragraph (d) shall not apply, and the
parties will be so notified.
Rule 32. Interest on judgment
Unless otherwise provided by law, if a judgment for
money in a civil case is affirmed, any interest allowed
by law shall be payable from the date the judgment
was entered in the district court, juvenile court, or
circuit court.

costs shall be allowed as ordered by the court. Costs
shall not be allowed or taxed in a criminal case.
(b) Costs for and against state of Utah. In cases
involving the state of Utah or an agency or officer
thereof, an award of costs for or against the state
shall be at the discretion of the court unless specifically required or prohibited by law.
\c> COBVB of brief* and attachments, -record,
bonds, and other expenses on appeal. The following may be taxed as costs in favor of the prevailing
party in the appeal: the actual costs of a printed or
typewritten brief and attachments, not to exceed
$3.00 for each page; actual costs incurred in the preparation and transmission of the record, including
costs of the reporter's transcript unless otherwise ordered by the court; premiums paid for supersedeas or
cost bonds to preserve rights pending appeal; and the
fees for filing and docketing the appeal.

(d) Bill of costs taxed after remittitur. When
costs are awarded to a party in an appeal from a district court, juvenile court, or circuit court, a party
claiming costs shall, within 15 days after the remittitur is filed with the clerk of the court from which the
appeal was taken, serve upon the adverse party and
file with the clerk of that court an itemized and verified bill of costs. The adverse party may, within five
days of service of the bill of costs, serve and file a
notice of objection, together with a motion to have the
costs taxed by the district courty juvenile court, or
circuit court. If there is no objection to the cost bill
within the allotted time, the clerk of that court shall
tax the costs as filed and enter judgment for the party
entitled thereto, which judgment shall be entered in
the judgment docket with the same force and effect as
in the case of other judgments of record. If the cost
bill of the prevailing party is timely.; opposed, the
clerk, upon reasonable notice and hearing, shall tax
the costs and enter a final determination and judgment which shall thereupon be entered in the judgment docket with the same force and effect as in the
case of other judgments of record. The determination
of the clerk shall be reviewable by the district court,
juvenile court, or circuit court upon the request of
either party made within five days of the entry of the
judgment.
(e) Costs in other proceedings and agency appeals. In all other matters before the Court of Appeals, including appeals from an agency, costs may be
allowed as in cases on appeal from a district court,
Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; juvenile court, or circuit court. Within 16 days after
the expiration of the time in which a petition for rerecovery of attorney fees.
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. If hearing may be filed or within 15 days after an order
the court determines that a motion made or an appeal denying such a petition, the party to whom costs have
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for de- been awarded may file with the clerk of the Court of
lay, it shall award just damages and single or double Appeals and serve upon the adverse party an itemcosts, including reasonable attorney fees, to the pre- ized and verified bill of costs. The adverse party may,
within five days after the service of the bill of costs,
vailing party.
(b) Disciplinary action for inadequate repre- file a notice of objection an.d a motion to have the
sentation. The court may impose appropriate sanc- costs taxed by the clerk. If no objection to the cost bill
tions against any counsel who inadequately repre- is filed within the allotted time, the clerk shall thereupon tax the costs and enter judgment against the
sents a client on appeal.
adverse party. If the adverse party timely objects to
Rule 34. Award of costs.
the cost bill, the clerk, upon reasonable notice and
(a) To whom allowed. Except as otherwise pro- hearing, shall determine and settle the costs and tax
vided by law, if an appeal is dismissed, costs shall be the same, and a judgment shall be entered thereon
taxed against the appellant unless otherwise agreed against the adverse party. The determination by the
by the parties or ordered by the court; if a judgment clerk shall be reviewable by the Court of Appeals
or order is affirmed, costs shall be taxed against the upon the request of either party made within five
appellant unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or days of the entry of judgment; unless otherwise ororder is reversed, costs shall be taxed against the re- dered, oral argument shall not be permitted A judgspondent unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or ment under this section may be filed with the clerk of
order is affirmed or reversed in part or is vacated, any district court in the state, who shall docket a
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A. VW. Lauritzen (1906)
Attorney for
326 North 100 East
P. Or Box 171
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (801) 753-3391
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
BOX ELDER COUNTY , BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT
CARL BAKER,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)

COMPLAINT

DALE BARNES dba BARNS
EQUIPMENT
Defendant.

)

No.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff and for a cause of action alleges:
1.

That P l a i n t i f f

is a

resident

Utah and the Defendant is a resident of

of I C a c h e C o u n t y S t a t e

Box Elder

of

County, State

of Utah and the cause of action arose in Bojc Elder County and the
amount in controversy is less that $10,000.00
2.
sold

to

That on or about the 7th day of Juhe, 1986 the Defendant
the

described as
one pair

Plaintiff

certain

one International

of John

Deere twin

total

of

$5500.00

but

more

Harvester tractor
rakes models

That Plaintiff has paid toward the
a

equipment

particularly
model 706 and

270 & 271 with cart.

aforesaid described equipment

Defendant has failed to deliver said

equipment whereby the Plaintiff has been damaged in the amount of
$5500.00

together with

interest from

June 1986 at the rate of 12%.
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and after the 7th day of

WHEREFORE Plaintiff

demands judgment

against the Defendant

in the amount 05500.00 together with interest and his costs,
DATED this

^

day of May, 1987.
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J;-. JUN2 4 198/ ij|j

Jeff R. Thome of Mann, Hadfield & Thome, #3250
Attorneys for Defendant
Zions Bank Building, 98 North Main
P. 0. Box "F"
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0906
Telephone 723-3404
IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT

CARL BAKER,

)

Plaintiff,
vs.
DALE BARNES dba BARNS
EQUIPMENT,

)

GENERAL ANSWER

)

Civil No.

)

Defendant.

)

Comes now the defendant and answers the complaint of
the plaintiff on file herein and for said answer admits,
denies and alleges as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
That said Complaint fails to state a cause of action
upon which relief can be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
1.

Answering each paragraph thereunder, the defendant

admits that the plaintiff is indebted in the amount of

$4,500.00 together with interest from and after June 7, 1986
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at the highest legal rate.

Defendant denies the balance of

said allegations.
DATED this

£?

day of June, 1987.

Je r W^i VTho rn e
MANN*, HADFIELD & THORNE
Attorneys for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
General Answer to A. W. Lauritzen, Attorney for Plaintiff,
P. 0. Box 171, Logan, Utah 84321, this 22nd day of June, 1987

^yfrv J^Y'/^'-^G
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U1'

leoLrtrL!
Jeff R. Thome of Mann, Hadfield & Thome, #3 250
Attorneys for Defendant
Zions Bank Building, 98 North Main
P. 0. Box "F"
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0906
Telehone 723-3404
IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT

CARL BAKER,
Plaintiff,
VS.

)

POST TRIAL BRIEF

)

Civil No. 873000183 CV

DALE BARNES dba BARNES
EQUIPMENT,
Defendant.

Comes now the defendant and submits the following post
trial brief.
FACTS
The testimony in the trial conclusively established as
facts the following items.
1.

On or about June 7, 198 6 Carl Baker came to the

place ,of business of Barnes Equipment in Tremonton, Utah
with the intention of purchasing a tractor.
2.

After some discussion, and after Mr. Baker has test

driven the tractor, he agreed to purchase an International
Parmall Tractor, Model 706, Serial No. 7780SY, for the sum
of $6,000.00. Mr. Baker also purchased one pair of John
2R

Deere Twin Rakes, Model 270 and 271, with rake cart for
$4,000.00.
3.

Mr. Baker traded in a Heston Swather for $4,500.00

credit and an International Harvester Side Rake for
$1,000.00 credit.
4.

Mr. Baker owed to Mr. Barnes as of June 7, 1986,

$4,500.00.
5; Mr. Baker indicated that he wanted to obtain his
own financing on the equipment and told Mr. Barnes that he
would obtain financing.
6.

By Bakers1 own admission at trial, he stated that

he felt it would take 60 to 90 days to get financing
accomplished.

(Mr. Barnes1 testimony was to the effect that

there was no agreed time for refinancing, but that he felt
financing should have been accomplished within 30 days and
after 30 days interest should accrue on the debt.
7.

The Farmall Tractor was delivered on June 7, 1986,

the date the agreement was reached, and within a week the
twin rakes were delivered, and within a week thereafter the
trade-in items were obtained by Mr. Barnes from Baker.
8.

Mr. Baker knew that he had to pay the $4,50 0.00 and

claimed to have been making arrangements with his bank for
financing.

Mr. Baker admitted that Mr. Barnes claimed an

interest in the property until they were paid for, and that
Mr. Baker had stated to Mr. Barnes that he would obtain

financing on the equipment*
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9.

Mr. Barnes testified that he repeatedly tried to

contact Mr. Baker and met with him on at least two occasions
and gave him credit applications so that he could begin
financing the equipment.
10.

Mr. Baker admitted that he did obtain a credit

report on at least one occasion but he did not fill it out
since he was seeking financing through Commercial Security
Bank.
11.

Mr. Barnes further testified that he made

approximately 40 phone calls to try to locate Mr. Baker to
try to get him to finance the equipment, that he had two
meetings set up but Mr. Baker never appeared, and that he
could never pin Mr. Baker down to get financing
accomplished on the equipment.
12.

Mr. Baker testified that on approximately

September 15, 1986 Mr. Barnes came back and picked up the
property sold.

Mr. Barnes testified that he repossessed the

equipment on November 15, 198 6.
POINT I
THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN DALE BARNES
AS SELLER AND CARL BAKER AS BUYER
CONSTITUTES A SECURITY AGREEMENT,
The Uniform Commercial Code is extremely liberal
regarding the requirements as to what constitutes a
"security agreement".

The reasons for this are that the

drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code recognized that the
actual business transactions between buyers and sellers
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often fail to get written documents signed, and the drafters
felt that it would be unfair to penalize someone just
because they did not have an explicit written document, see
official comment to U.C.C. Comment under § 2-201.
UTAH CODE ANNO. § 70A-9-105(h) states:
"Security agreement" means an agreement which
creates or provides for a security interest"
An agreement is a defined term under the Commercial
Code.

Section 70A-1-201(3) states:
"Agreement" means the bargain of the parties in
fact as found in their language or by implication
from other circumstances including course of
dealing of usage of trade or course of performance
as provided in this act (sections 70A-1-205 and
70A-2-208). Whether an agreement has legal
consequences is determined by the provisions of
this act, if applicable; otherwise by the law of
contracts (section 70A-1-103). (Compare
"Contract").

Thus an "agreement" is basically the parties "bargain".

Security interest is also defined a term.

UTAH CODE ANNO.

§70A-1-201(37) states:
"Security interest" means an interest in personal
property or fixtures which secures payment or
performance of an obligation...."
From the evidence it is clear that the parties intended that
Dale Barnes would retain an interest in the property until
he was paid in full, and thus, a security agreement existed
and the parties rights are governed by the Utah Commercial
Code.
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The statute of frauds provisions of the Utah Commercial
Code, see UTAH CODE ANNO. §7 0A-2-201 provides a minimum of
requirements to have an enforceable contract.

These minimum

legal requirements are:
(a)

A writing;

(b)

Signed by the party against who it is enforced;

(c)

A description of the collateral.

Under subparagraph 70A-2-201(2), if between merchants within
a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the cohtract
and sufficient against the sender is received and the party
receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies
the requirements of subsection (1) unless the party objects
to it.

Thus when Barnes mailed the invoice to Baker (PI.

Ex. A) and Baker failed to object it bound him.
Then conclusively 70A-2-201 (3) (b)& (c) recognizes part
performance and also recognizes that if a party admits in
its pleadings or testimony that a contract exists, that it
satisfies the statutes of fraud provisions and the agreement
is legally enforceable.
Thus the formal requirements for a contract have
clearly been met inasmuch as plaintiff's Exhibit A evidences
the agreement between the parties that Carl Baker was to
receive a tractor and rakes and traded in a swather and side
rake and that he owed Dales Barnes $4,500.00.

Additionally

Carl Baker admitted in his pleadings and in his testimony
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that an agreement existed and Dale Barnes claimed an
interest in the equipment.

Therefore, there can be no

mistake that a "contract" and "security agreement11 existed
between the plaintiff and defendant,
POINT II
DALE BARNES WAS LEGALLY ENTITLED
TO REPOSSESS THE PROPERTY ON
DEFAULT.
Uniform Commercial Code recognizes that |all terms to a
contract may not be in writing.

The official comments to

the Uniform Commercial Code states:
"The required writing need not contain all the
materials and terms of the contract and such
material terms as are stated need not be precisely
stated. All that is required is that the writing
afford a basis for believing that the offerdoral
evidence rest upon a real transaction." See
Official Comments Uniform Commercial Code, UTAH
CODE ANNO. §70A-2-201 Comment No. ^.
The main difference of opinion in this trial between Baker
and Barnes was the time in which the $4,500.00 would be
paid.

By his own admission, Baker acknowledged that he

recognized he would have to pay the amount within 60 to 90

i.
days, but both he and Mr. Barnes testifxed that there was no
specific time set for payment.

In this regard Section

70A-2-309 states the time must be reasonableL
The official comment under this section states:
"A time for payment where not agreed upon, is
related to the time of delivery;11 Comment 2
Section 70A-2-310 provides:
"Unless otherwise agreed

(a) payment is due at the time and place at
which the buyer is to receive! the goods..."
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The Uniform Commercial Code §70A-l-203 also imposes an
obligation of good faith.

This section states:

"Every contract or duty within this act imposes an
obligation of good faith in its performance or
enforcement."
Section 70A-1-204 provides:
"Whenever this act requires any action to be taken
within a reasonable time, any time which is not
manifestly unreasonable may be fixed by
agreement."
While there was no specific time agreed to on June 7, 1986,
when the $4,500.00 was to be paid by Mr. Baker to Mr.
Barnes, the evidence is clear that Mr. Baker stated that he
would have his bank finance the machinery and pay off Mr.
Barnes.

Mr. Baker had the machinery for the entire growing

season of 1986, and by his own testimony the machinery was
not repossessed until September 15, 1986, a period of 100
days.

It is also clear that Mr. Barnes offered to let Mr.

Baker have the property that he repossessed if he would pay
him his amount due together with interest, and even
continued the offer up to the date of trial.
By Mr. Baker's version of the facts he had 100 days in
which to arrange financing and he never did so, and by his
own admission 60 to 90 days was what he felt was reasonable.
Mr. Barnes indicated that he felt 30 days was reasonable to
arrange a time and that he did not in fact repossess the
machinery until November 15, 1986, a period of 161 days.
The failure of Baker to act in good faith within a

reasonable time to finance the equipment constitutes a
default.
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The Uniform Commercial Code clearly gives the seller
the right upon default to repossess the property.

UTAH CODE

ANNO. §70A-9-503 provides:
"Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on
default the right to take possession of the
collateral. In taking possession a secured party
may proceed without judicial process if this can
be done without breach of the peace or may proceed
by action."
After repossession Baker never complained until April
28 or 29, 1987, and he was then given the option to pay the
debt and still get his equipment.
The Uniform Commercial Code also obligates a secured
party to dispose of collateral after default in a
commercially reasonable manner.

UTAH CODE ANNO. §70A-9-504.

After repossession and after reasonable notification of the
time and place, the secured party may sell the property by
either public or private sale.

Mr. Baker received notice

that Mr. Barnes intended to try to sell the property and Mr.
Baker made no effort to reclaim the equipment or to pay the
debt.
POINT III
MR. BARNES IS ENTITLED TO THE
REASONABLE COSTS OF REPOSSESSING
THE PROPERTY TOGETHER WITH REPAIR
COSTS AND INTEREST AT THE RATE OF
TEN PERCENT (10%) PER ANNUM.
UTAH CODE ANNO. §15-1-1 provides for interest at the
rate of ten percent in the absence of a contract specifying
a different rate.

Mr. Barnes further stated that in his
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course of dealings that after 3 0 days interest would accrue.
Thus, interest began accruing on the $4,500.00 on July 7,
1986, and accrues interest at the rate of $1.23 per day up
to date of judgment and then at 12% from judgment until
paid,
Mr. Barnes further testified that it took him eight
hours on Friday and eight hours on Saturday and six hours on
Monday to ultimately obtain possession of the property and
repossess the same, and that his hourly rate was $30.00 per
hour, which would give him repossession charges of $660.00.
He also testified that it cost him $100.00 to repair the
rakes.
Thus, up to the time of trial Mr. Barnes had accrued
interest of $602.52, repossession charges of $660.00, and
repair cost of $100.00.

When added to the principal amount

of $4,500.00 this made Mr. Baker indebted to Mr. Barnes in
the amount of $5,862.52.

To the extent that Mr. Barnes is

able to sell the property for amounts in excess of the
amount owed, that money would go to Mr. Baker.

If Mr. Baker

honestly believed that the property was so valuable, he
obviously would have accepted the offer to pay the balance
owed and take the property.

Until such time as Mr. Barnes

sells the property and is able to determine the costs and
expenses, he is not able to make any claim against Mr. Baker
or Mr. Baker make any claim against him.
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POINT IV
THE PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO MEET
THE BURDEN OF PROOF SUFFICIENT TO
SHOW HIS CASE.
All contract law can basically be summarized by the
statement that:
M

A party is entitled to be put in the same
position he would have been, had the other party
fully performed the contract,"
In this matter it is clear that Mr. Baker breached the
contract by failing to finance or otherwise pay to
Mr. Barnes the amount of money owed.

Mr. Barnes was legally

entitled to repossess the property sold to Mr. Baker and to
try to sell the same and apply it against the debt owed to
him.

The complaint of the plaintiff does not allege any

wrongful repossession and claims that:
"The defendant failed to deliver said equipment
whereby plaintiff has been damaged in the amount
of $5,500.00 together with interest from and after
the 7th day of June, 1986 at the rate of 12%."
The evidence is adamantly clear that the items were
delivered; that Mr. Baker used them during the entire farm
season of 198 6; that he failed to make any payment and that
he never did obtain any financing (although his testimony
was that he was trying to); that he knew Mr. Barnes
repossessed the same and he failed to make any contact; that
Mr. Barnes sent him registered letters apprising him that he
could pick up the property by paying the contract balance,
and that he refused to do so.
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CONCLUSION
The defendant therefore requests that the action be
dismissed and that he be awarded his costs and expenses
incurred*
DATPD this

1J

day of October, 1987.

Thorne
MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE
Attorneys for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the
X I day of October,
1987, I fnailed a copy of the foregoing Post Trial Brief to
A. W. Lauritzen, Attorney for Plaintiff, P. 0. Box 171,
Logan, Utah 84321.

* /

Secretary
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A. W. Lauritzen (1906)
Attorney for Plaintiff
326 North 100 East
P. 0. Box 171
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (801) 753-3391
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
BOX ELDER COUNTY,

BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT

CARL BAKER,

)

Plaintiff,
vs.

>
)
>

DALE BARNES dba BARNES,
EQUIPMENT,

)
)

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S CONTENTIONS

)

873000183CV

ISSUE
The court

has certified a question to the parties regarding

the right of the seller to reposess absent a conditional
security agreement

sale or

and as a corollary proposition whether or not

the seller retains some

sort of

interest in

and delivered,

goods sold

equitable, possessory

or legal

such interest to persist

until payment be made.
FACTS
The facts of this case are relatively simple, it seem that
on

or

about

the

7th

day

of

Plaintiff farm

equipment

for

received

equipment

from

back

June

the Defendant sold to the

$10,000.00
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and contemporaneously

the Plaintiff valued at $5500.00

2
crediting it to Plaintiff's
$4500.00,

It was

account

agreed between

and

showing

a

the parties that the $450(

would be paid by

the Plaintiff

to the

indefinite date,

but certainly

it seem

Defendant at

year 1986.

Apparently

success

and

the

season

have made

although his efforts wh

somewhat desultory, Defendant attempted to contact
without

some li

to have been within

contemplation of the parties that the payment would
the calendar

balanc

becoming

uncertain the Defendant finally located his

the Plaint

late

the

weat

equipment and ret<

the same without actual notice being given to the Plaintiff.
Plaintiff became aware of the
event,.

Apparently the

returned in

was always

Defendant maintains

business open.

shortly

at his

the acti

place of busine

that he was unable to find t

Upon Plaintiff contacting

the Spring

after

Defendant then left the area for Arize

but maintains that someone
although the

taking

the Defendant

when

the Defendant told the Plaintiff that l

was sorry, he had to repossess the equipment and it was no longc
available and

" he owed the Plaintiff nothing".

change of heart the Defendant directed
offering

to

allow

the

the Plaintif

Plaintiff to reclaim his equipment upo

payment of the balanceof $4500.00 with
was unwilling

letters to

Thereafter in

and uninterested

he having purchased substitute

interest.

The Plaintif

in taking up this renewed offer,
equipment and

position.
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having changed his

3
This suit was then filed.
ISSUE
Whether or not an automatic right of repossession remains in
the seller.
ARGUMENT
WHETHER OR NOT AN AUTOMATIC RIGHT OF REPOSSESSION REMAINS IN
THE SELLER.
UCA 70A-9-201 through 203 read as follows;
"GENERAL VALIDITY OF SECURITY
Except as otherwise provided
by this act a security
agreement is effective according
to its terms between
the parties, against purchasers of the collateral and
against creditors.
Nothing
in this chapter validates
any charge or practice illegal under any statute or
regulation
thereunder
governing
usury,
small loans,
retail installments sales, or the like, or extends the
application of any such statute or regulation to any
transaction not otherwise subject thereto.
TITLE TO COLLATERAL IMMATERIAL
Each provision of this chapter with regard to rights,
obligations
and remedies applies whether title to
collateral is in the secured party or in the debtor.
ATTACHMENT AND ENFORCEABILITY
OF SECURITY INTERESTPROCEEDS, FORMAL REQUISITES.
<1) Subject to the provisions of section 70A-4-208 on
the security interest of a collecting
bank and section
70A-9-113 on a security
interest
arising under the
chapter on ©ales,
m
oecurity
interest
la not
enforceable
against the debtor or third parties with
respect to the collateral
and does not attach unless
(a) the collateral is in the possession of the secured
party pursuant to agreement, or the debtor has signed a
security agreement which contains a description of the
collateral and in addition, when the security interest

covers crops

growing or

to be

grown or

timber to be

cut, a description of the land concerned; and (b) value
has been given; and
(c) the debtor has rights in the
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collateral.
(2)
A security
interest
attaches when it becomes
enforceable against the debtor with respect
to the
collateral.
Attachment occurs as soon as all of the
events specified in subsection
(I) have taken place
unless explicit
agreement
postpones
the time of
attaching.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed a security agreement gives
the secured
party the rights to proceeds provided by
section 70A-9-306.
<4) A transaction,
although subject to this chapter,
is also subject to the Utah Uniform Consumer Credit
Code,
and
in the
case of
conflict between
the
provisions of
this chapter
and the utah
Uniform
Consumer Credit Code, the provisions of the latter
statute control. Failure to comply with any applicable
statute has only the effect which is specified therein.
It is apparent that in order for the
ma provided

in UCA

70A-9-306 the

writing or that the secured party
collateral pursuant

to at

secured party

would have

70A-9-503 and dispose the
Each of

these sections

terms

must retain

of

counsel

possession of "t

oral agreement.
a

security

It appea

agreement t

the right to take possession under Ut
collateral pursuant
subsumes that

appears

in

UCA

to UCA 70A-9-5O

the secured

compliance with UCA 70A-9-203 quoted above.
Plaintiff's

to proc

security agreement must be

least an

that upon default from the

secured party

party was i

Nothing

70A-1-20I

or

apparent t
any

othe

provisions of title 70A or any other provision

in the

Annotated which

of 70A-9-203.

would alter

the requirements

was argued by Plaintiff at trial
aggrieved

party,

could

proceed

it seem

Utah Cod<

that Plaintiff,

As

as ar

under two theories, that being

that there a unilateral recision by the retaking
42

of the property

5
which

would

require

the

Plaintiff in his original
that there

was a

Defendant

to

position.

conversion of

once

again

The other

place the

theory would be

the collateral by the Defendant

raising a right in the Plaintiff to money damages.

The evidence

seems to point to the former, that the Defendant, at least in his
mind, retained some interest in the property and
again restore

himself to

requiring that he once
position prior

the possession of the property thereby

again place

to the sale.

the Defendant

maintains

that

in Defendants

UCA 70A-2-106 defines a sale as the

passing of title from the seller to the
Defendant

elected to once

a

sale

buyer for

actually

a price.

occurred and title

passed then the Defendant could only be restored to title
of legal

If

by way

process that being an execution pursuant to a judgment.

If the sale was not complete but was terminated by the act of the
Defendant

or

by

the

Plaintiff

and

executory which it would appear that

the

contract

the contract

was

still

was, then the

equitable remedies under the doctrine of recision would come into
play.
One thing seems apparent, the Defendant may not
own

goods

and

retain

both

his

own

goods

and

Plaintiff thereby having the best of two worlds.
above all,

reclaim his
those of the

The

court must

do justice, and it appears that justice at this point

can only be done by
Plaintiff lost

adequately

goods.

compensating

the

Plaintiff for

The evidence which is before the court is
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that his loss goods had a value of
are

not

available

to

be

$5500.00 and

since the gc

restored to the Plaintiff he musi

compensated for the value of said goods..
CONCLUSION
The court should, in the absence of any
for the

statutory author

action of the Defendant, award judgment to the Plaint

for $5500.00.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED th is C7^
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